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Identity and Commitment: Sen's 
Fourth Aspect of the Self 
JOHN B. DAVIS· 
Amartya Sen has made examination of the behavioral foundations of 
economics and their connection to three different interpretations of the 
"privateness" of the individual a central theme of his work. He has also 
associated this examination with the issue of how we might talk about the 
self or the identity of individual. This paper argues that while Sen frames his 
views about identity primarily in terms of social identity or in connection 
with how individuals identify with others, his thinking about social identity 
derives from his understanding of commitment and its association with a 
fourth aspect of the self that provides the basis for an account of individual 
or personal identity. The key to this argument lies in how Sen extends 
his "privateness" framework to distinguish this fourth aspect of the self as 
different in kind from the three standard, self-interest-based aspects of the 
self employed in neoclassical behavioral models. This fourth aspect of the 
self, or "commitment self," is linked to Sen's emphasis on individuals being 
able to engage in reasoning and self-scrutiny. Individuals understood in 
terms of this capacity, however, can be seen to be distinct and re-identifiable 
beings, and thus be said to have personal identities. Seeing them in this way, 
moreover, links to Sen's later thinking about functionings and capabilities, 
and makes it possible to argue that the capability framework either employs 
or can make use of an understanding of personal identity. This paper 
offers an interpretation of this possible identity framework for Sen, and 
also briefly discusses how it might be used to address one of the leading 
criticisms of Sen's approach to thinking about capabilities, namely, that it 
lacks a short-list of essential capabilities. 
.. 
314 JOHN B. DAVIS 
Section 1 first reviews Sen's "privateness" framework and its relation 
to commitment, considers recent criticisms of the idea that commitment 
stands outside of this framework, and then considers how the different 
forms of "privateness" and commitment differ in terms of individual self-
regard and reflexivity. Section 2 discusses Sen's views on identity as social 
identification and suggests ways in which these views are connected to his 
thinking about individual identity and rationality. Section 3 sets forth my 
earlier application of collective intentionality analysis to account for Sen's 
thinking about personal and social identity. Section 4 provides a related 
but different interpretation of Sen's thinking about personal and social 
identity that rather emphasizes the concept of commitment, and draws 
on Bernard Williams' understanding of integrity as based on identity-
conferring commitments. Section 5 briefly addresses Martha Nussbaum's 
critique of Sen's framework that it fails to identifY a short-list of essential 
capabilities, and argues that understanding personal identity as a basic 
capability provides one way of answering this critique. Section 6 offers four 
concluding comments on the paper's motivations. 
1. The "privateness" framework and the 
fourth aspect of the self 
Sen distinguishes three aspects of the self or concepts of the person that 
operate in one form or another in standard economics' characterizations 
of self-interest, and then contrasts all three with a fourth aspect of the self 
and concept of the person associated with commitment (Sen 1985; 2002: 
33-7, 206-2 4). The three standard types of "privateness" and aspects of 
the self are: 
Self-centered welfare: A person's welfare depends only on her own conswnption and 
other features of the richness of her life (without any sympathy or antipathy toward 
others, and without any procedural concern). 
Self-welfare goal: A person's only goal is to maximize her own welfare. 
Self-goal choice: A person's choices must be based entirely on the pursuit of her own 
goals. (Sen 2002 : 33-4) 
Though Sen finds that these different aspects of the self are often lumped 
together and not well distinguished in standard economics, he shows that 
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they are independent from one another in a number of ways, and can play 
distinct roles in different behavioral models. 
Sen's fourth concept of the self is associated with individuals making 
commitments. He originally introduced the concept of commitment by 
contrasting sympathy and commitment (Sen 1977), but with his subse-
quent distinction between self-welfare goal and self-goal choice-both of 
which make individual well-being depend upon something other than the 
individual's own consumption and self-centered welfare-making choices 
based on one's commitments comes to be understood to be a matter of 
making choices irrespective of any kind of personal gain or loss. As he puts 
it then: 
Commitment .. . is concerned with breaking the tight link between individual 
welfare (with or without sympathy) and the choice of action (e.g., acting to help 
remove some misery even though one personally does not suffer from it). Sympathy 
alone does not require any departure from individual-welfare maximization: but 
commitment does involve rejection of that assumption. (Sen 1982: 8) 
Taking all three of these forms of 'privateness' to generally be a matter of 
individual self-regard, we might accordingly say that introducing commit-
ment breaks the "tight link." between individual self-regard in any form 
and individual choice of action. 
Recently, however, the idea that commitment somehow escapes self-
regard has been challenged. Philip Pettit (2005) focuses on Sen's distinction 
between self-goal choice and commitment, and asserts it to be highly 
implausible. He treats commitment as being either own goal-modifying 
or own goal-displacing, sees the latter as closer to Sen's meaning, and 
interprets commitment as putting aside one's own goals to act on those 
of another. But he doubts it ever makes sense to say one could fail to act 
on one's own goals, since one's acting on the goals of another must still 
be a matter of acting on one's own goals. This charge, however, mixes 
together something being one's own act and that act being one's own goal 
by characterizing the former as one's own goal. Sen of course knows that 
acting on the goals of another is one's own act and that intentional action is 
goal-directed. But that an action is one's own goal in this intentional action 
sense still allows for a distinction between acting on one's own particular 
goals and ignoring those particular goals to act on goals of others. More 
.. 
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generally, action need not always be self-regarding though it is nonetheless 
one's own action. 
A somewhat different criticism of commitment comes from Dan Haus-
man (2005) who argues that the concept of preference in economics is 
ambiguous, but that if understood broadly as an all-things-considered type 
ranking, it could accommodate commitment as one type of preference. 
Hausman's proposal to sharpen the concept of preference is entirely rea-
sonable, but it does not imply, as he allows, that commitment is necessarily 
a kind of preference. In fact, Hausman understands his recommendation to 
refine the preference concept as a strategic prescription designed to make 
it easier to deal with the complexity of human motivation, and recognizes 
that Sen has adopted a different, also reasonable, strategy toward this same 
goal by distinguishing preference and commitment. That is, he does not 
believe self-goal choice and commitment cannot be distinguished, and pri-
marily disagrees with Sen over strategic objectives. We might note, then, 
that Sen's objective as he has recently stated it is not so much to improve 
the preference framework but rather to explain different formulations of 
rationality as being due to differences over how one understands the domain 
of reason (Sen 2005). 
In what follows, then, I attempt to get at what this may involve by re-
examining the structure of Sen's "privateness" framework and its relation to 
commitment along two lines. First, note that his three types of "privateness" 
can be ranked in the order he provides according to the degree to which they 
emphasize an individual's own self-regard. Self-centered welfare concerns 
only an individual's own satisfaction (or desire fulfillment), but self-welfare 
goal allows other individuals' satisfactions to enter into an individual's 
satisfaction through sympathy (or antipathy), and self-goal choice allows 
for non-welfarist goals that are altogether removed from an individual 
satisfaction (the pursuit of social justice). Second, if we emphasize the 
reflexivity of "privateness" in terms of three ways that individuals affect 
themselves by the choices they make, Sen's three aspects of "privateness" 
can be ranked according to the degree to which this reflexive relation 
incorporates considerations external to the individual. Only self-centered 
welfare is independent of such considerations. Individuals affect themselves 
by their choices without any external mediation. But with self-welfare 
goal individuals affect themselves through concern for others' welfare, 
and with self-goal choice individuals affect themselves through concern 
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for matters that transcend individuals' welfare altogether. Thus, across the 
three forms of "privateness," choice is increasingly non-self-regarding and 
reflexively affects individuals through considerations increasingly external 
to the individual. 
Extending this double characterization of the three types of "privateness" 
to commitment, then, we may add that commitment eliminates self-regard 
understood as the individual's pursuit of own goals altogether as a dimension 
of choice. But since the reflexivity of "privateness" is a matter of how 
individuals affect themselves in the choices they make, is commitment, in 
"breaking the tight link between individual welfare .. . and the choice of 
action," still a reflexive relation? That is, does commitment's elimination 
of self-regard also involve an elimination of any sort of self-referencing? In 
fact, Sen's fourth aspect of the self and concept of the person associated 
with commitment is quite explicitly reflexive. The fourth aspect of the self 
considers individuals as being able to engage in reasoning and self-scrutiny. 
"A person is not only an entity that can enjoy one's own consumption, 
experience, and appreciate one's welfare, and have one's goals, but also an 
entity that can examine one's values and objectives and choose in the light 
of those values and objectives" (Sen 2002: 36). 
Sen's clear coupling, as he also puts it, of "one's own reasoning and 
self-scrutiny" (Sen 2002: 36) demonstrates that he sees his concept of 
commitment as pre-eminently possessing a reflexive dimension. At the same 
time, Sen associates commitment and self-scrutiny with the "problem" of 
"the 'identity' of a person, that is, how the person sees himself or herseIr' 
(Sen 2002: 215). Thus, to better understand this further connection, we 
tum to Sen's stated views on identity. 
2. Sen on identity, commitment, and agency 
Sen's primary way of talking about the concept of the identity of a person is 
that of social identity, or the idea of identifying with others. Once one goes 
beyond the trivial or logical concept of identity-the idea that an object is 
necessarily identical with itself-"we shift our attention from the notion of 
being identical to that of sharing an identity, and to the idea of identifying oneself 
with others ofa particular group" (Sen I999b: 2). One source of this notion 
of identifying with others in Sen's thinking is his ordering of aspects of the 
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self and types of "privateness" in standard economics' characterizations of 
self- interest. Thus, the long-standing emphasis in standard economic theory 
on self-interest, he notes, excludes from the outset the idea that individuals 
might identify with others in deciding on their objectives and making their 
choices (ibid.) . Yet if one intends to broaden the behavioral foundations of 
economics, one may move progressively through a set of enlargements of 
the individual, first, by opening the door to the idea that one's self-interest 
may be influenced by sympathy (or antipathy) toward others (self-welfare 
goal), next by including the idea that one's goals may include considerations 
other than one's own welfare (self-goal choice), and fmally by supposing 
that one may act on principles altogether removed from one's own personal 
welfare as when one identifies in some way with others (commitment). 
Thus, identification with others through commitment merely carries Sen's 
ordering of types of "privateness" that underlies his classification of the 
different features of the self but one step further. 1 At the same time, 
this additional step is a significant one, not only in "breaking the tight 
link between individual welfare ... and the choice of action," but indeed 
in raising the issue of whether or how the individual even remains an 
individual when identifying with others. 
A second source of the idea of identifying with others is Sen's early 
interest in multiple preferences and meta-rankings. One good reason to 
suppose preference rankings are incomplete and at best offer incomplete 
quasi-orderings is that individuals might have multiple preferences that they 
cannot immediately reconcile. Sen's original interest in multiple preference 
rankings stems from his desire to improve the behavioral foundations 
of economics, analyze various moral dilemmas, and investigate social 
cooperation, but his explanation of why we might have multiple rankings 
is that we have multiple social identifications with others. 
Conununity, nationality, race, sex, union membership, the fellowship of oligop-
olists, revolutionary solidarity, and so on, all provide identities that can be, 
depending on the context, crucial to our view of ourselves, and thus to the way 
we view our welfare, goals, or behavioral obligations. (Sen 2002: 215) 
We might then say that one sees oneself as a certain type of person, and 
having different meta-rankings means one can also see oneself simultane-
ously as different types of persons. Note that seeing oneself as a certain 
type of person suggests one is still a distinct individual, albeit under some 
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description. Yet at times Sen's association of social identification and com-
mitment threatens to undermine this interpretation, as when he asserts that 
seeing oneself as a member of a social group goes beyond sympathizing 
with members of that group, and involves "actually identifying with them" 
(ibid.). 2 Indeed, this strong sense of social identification is important to his 
view of the seriousness with which we need to look at the issue of our 
having multiple social identifications, since having multiple meta-rankings 
produces "conflicting demands arising from different identities and affilia-
tions" (Sen 1999b: 30) . From this perspective, we might thus say that for 
Sen the issue of whether or how an individual identified with and having 
commitments to others remains a distinct individual is a matter of whether 
the individual is able to sustain a personal unity and integrity across these 
conflicting multiple associations. 
Interestingly, Sen suggests we might understand social identification in 
terms of our use of first-person plural speech. 
The nature of our language often underlines the forces of our wider identity. "We" 
demand things; "our" actions reflect "our" concerns; "we" protest at injustice 
done to "us." This is, of course, the language of social intercourse and politics, but 
it is difficult to believe that it represents nothing other than a verbal form, and in 
particular no sense of identity. (Sen 2002: 215; also cf. p. 41) 
Since by "sense of identity" Sen means social identity, we have a sug-
gestion here that social identity as reflected in first-person plural speech 
might be understood in collective or shared intentionality terms.3 Though 
he does not develop this idea systematically, he nonetheless alludes to the 
convention-based, reciprocal feedback framework used by some contrib-
utors to the collective intentionality literature (e.g., Tuomela 1995; Davis 
2oo3a) when he comments on an apparent tendency in experimental game 
theory for players to want to know the identity of fellow players (Sen 
op. cit.). Thus he associates "we" language and social identification with 
the notion that not only players' choices but also identities are somehow 
mutually constitutive of one another in games. Sen's focus is on how 
one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games may become Assurance games, but if 
we broaden the framework to, say, repeated game formats where the Folk 
Theorem applies, or allow for pre-play communication considerations, all 
sorts of results are possible, some of which it seems fair to say might make 
.. 
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use of explanations of social identity in some form of first-person plural 
speech, collective intentionality analysis. 
Returning to the question of personal identity, then, how does Sen's 
thinking about social identification fit with his emphasis on individual 
choice as central to the behavioral foundations of economics? Sen maps 
out his answer to this question in relation to communitarian critiques 
of liberal theories of justice. Such critiques, he notes, have at times been 
employed to argue that individuals' reasoning abilities are effectively captive 
to their (pre-existing) social identities, which are "not a relationship they 
choose (as in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not 
merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity" (Sandel 1998: 150; 
quoted in Sen 1999b: 16). On this view, one's identity is something one 
discovers-communitarians sometimes say 'perceive'-and the way that 
one reasons then depends upon this identity. Sen's response to this is to 
reject the false dichotomy it involves between perfecdy autonomous choice 
and perfecdy determined choice. 
The alternative to the "discovery" view is not choice from positions "unencum-
bered" with any identity (as communitarian expositions often seem to imply), 
but choices that continue to exist in any encumbered position one happens to 
occupy. Choice does not require jumping out of nowhere into somewhere. (Sen 
1999b : 23) 
That is, choice may be influenced but is not determined by social identifi-
cation. Social identities are indeed important. So is choice. 
But while we may agree with him about this in principle, one would 
also like to know more about how this might be the case. Hints come 
in Sen's characterization of the fourth aspect of the self associated with 
commitment where he links "one's own reasoning and self-scrutiny" (Sen 
2002: 36). We saw above that on this view a person is someone who is able 
to "examine one's values and objectives and choose in the light of those 
values and objectives" (Sen 2002: 36). As if answering the communitarians 
again, this passage continues, 
Our choices need not relentlessly follow our experiences of consumption or welfare, 
or simply translate perceived goals into action. We can ask what we want to do and 
how, and in that context also examine what we should want and how. (Sen ibid. ; 
emphasis added) 
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Note, then, that this ability individuals are said to have to stand apart, as 
it were, from their goals and objectives in order to scrutinize and evaluate 
them in a reasoned way gives them a status as agents that is absent in Sen's 
first three aspects of the self. First, from the vantage point of the individual, 
there is a fundamental difference between this sort of reflexive relationship 
and those associated with the other forms of the self Sen distinguishes. 
For self-centered welfare, self-welfare goal, and self-goal choice, when 
individuals make choices they are affected by own consumption, sympathy 
or antipathy, and non-welfare goals respectively. But individuals engaged in 
reasoned self-scrutiny are not only ciffected but also ciffect themselves in virtue 
of adding their evaluation of the effects of their choices upon themselves 
to those effects themselves. Second, from the vantage point of others, 
whereas reflexivity operates in Sen's three original aspects of the self in 
terms of increasingly non-private, other-referencing sorts of considerations, 
in the case of his fourth aspect of the self, reflexivity involves a relation 
between an-at least loosely-identifiable social group and the individual 
with a now elevated status as an agent able to engage in some form of 
self-evaluation. I thus suggest that Sen's response to (strong) communitarian 
thinking about individuals and their social identities is to say that individuals 
have identities that are in some sense independent of their social identities. 
That is, they have both social identities and personal identities. 
3. Self-scrutiny, shared intentions, 
and personal identity 
Here I review the argument I previously used to develop a conception of 
personal identity for Sen's capability framework (Davis 2002, 2003b: ch. 8), 
in order to compare it to one that makes use of Sen's emphasis on individuals 
as engaged in reasoning and self-scrutiny. That argument proceeded by 
applying collective intentionality analysis to Sen's understanding of the 
individual agent, and then asking how individuals thus understood might 
be thought distinct and re-identiflable across change. The point of entry for 
the argument was Nancy Folbre's "structures of constraint" interpretation 
of individuals having multiple, conflicting social identifications. As she 
expresses it: 
.. 
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Individuals cannot be located by a single set of coordinates, because they operate 
in many different collective dimensions, within many different chosen and given 
groups. Nor can they be located by a list of all the given groups to which they 
belong, by a simple "adding up" of separate positions. The interaction between 
different dimensions of collective identity affects the choices individuals make 
about which collective interests to pursue. (Folbre 1994: 52 - 3) 
How, then, do individuals manage the "interaction between different 
dimensions of [their] collective identity?" In her attention to women in 
particular, Folbre stressed the need for women to be able to move back and 
forth between their different roles, and not be confined to any single set of 
roles. This suggests that women need to possess a special capacity not only 
to be able to move between roles, but also to do so with versatility, that 
is, to be able to move successfully in and out of often very different roles 
without high adjustment costs to themselves and others. 4 Having a special 
capacity of this sort would provide women (or individuals in general) a 
measure of detachment and independence from their competing social 
roles, but at the same time it would enable them to actively embrace these 
different, often conflicting roles. 
One way, then, to understand this special capacity as a combination of 
independence and affiliation with groups is to apply collective intentionality 
analysis to how women affiliate with social groups. Broadly speaking, 
collective intentionality analysis examines how distinct individuals may 
fonn shared intentions in their interaction with one another (c£ Gilbert 
1989; Tuomela 1995). My approach to collective intentionality analysis 
is to explicate the normal success conditions associated with flrst-person 
plural speech or the use of "we" language. Particularly important here is 
that such language is used in a perfonnative manner. To say that a fonn 
of speech has a perforrnative character is to say that individuals not only 
communicate in using it but also accomplish some action in doing so. Thus, 
when individuals use "we" language to express intentions they believe to 
be shared, they might be thought to be intent upon establishing some 
shared understanding with others to whom their use of the tenn "we" 
applies in regard to the content of the proposition they have expressed. For 
example, if I say "we are happy with our work," I not only express my own 
view about our work, but by including others to whom the "we" applies I 
also suppose that others have the same view of it. Emphasizing the normal 
success conditions associated with using flrst-person plural speech, then, is 
IDENTITY AND COMMITMENT 323 
a matter of whether my action is successful, where an important indication 
of success is that others do not challenge what I have said. 
Individuals having a special capacity to move comfortably back and 
forth across their different social affiliations may now be understood in 
connection with their capacity to use "we" language. The capacity to 
move comfortably across one's different social affiliations requires being 
able to both identify with others and yet still preserve an independence and 
detachment from them. On the one hand, the identification-with-others 
side of this is captured in how the normal use of "we" language requires 
identification with the intentions of others to whom this language applies. 
On the other hand, an individual's expression of a collective intention 
is still an individual's intentional expression, and since shared intentions 
can only be formed by those who have them, such language also requires 
that the individual have an independence and detachment from others 
to whom their "we" language applies. We might thus say that under 
normal conditions individuals freely constrain themselves in their expression 
of collective intentions. Thus individuals might be said to have a special 
capacity to move comfortably back and forth across their different social 
affiliations when they are able to successfully exercise their capacity to 
express collective intentions in social groups. 
Needless to say, much more needs to be said about how having 
a capacity to freely move across one's social affiliations can be related 
to the capacity to successfully express collective intentions within the 
groups in which one operates. Here, however, I want to emphasize 
how anchoring an independence-preserving mobility across groups in 
how individuals freely constrain themselves within groups-as captured in 
the logic of normal expression of collective intentions-tells us something 
about personal identity and Sen's views. One argument is that the concept of 
personal identity requires some understanding ofindividuals apart from their 
social identification with others, and that Sen's emphasis on individuals as 
reflexively detached agents suggests a way of developing this understanding. 
Let me now try to explain this in connection with individuals' expression 
of collective intentions. 
An individual's expression of a collective intention, it seems fair to 
say, involves just the sort of reflexive self-scrutiny and evaluation of 
own objectives that Sen emphasizes. When an individual asserts, "we 
are happy with our work," it is normally the case that the individual 
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considers whether individually expressing this intention aligns her or him 
with what others believe about their work.s That is, the individual must 
scrutinize and evaluate what she or he intends relative to what others 
might intend. There are two reasons for saying that this distinguishes or 
individuates the individual. First, the self-scrutiny involved in considering 
one's own expression of a collective intention relative to what others intend 
itself distinguishes the individual from others. In effect, the individual 
distinguishes herself or himself in an exercise of comparative thinking. 
Second, actually expressing a collective intention requires that the individual 
freely bind herself or himself to whatever the content of that collective 
intention implies. But since only the individual can freely bind herself or 
himself to something, this act is self-individuating. 
The interpretation that I thus previously offered of Sen's thinking in 
regard to personal identity begins with the problem of social identifica-
tion, builds on his emphasis on individuals as agents having a capacity for 
reflexive self-scrutiny, develops this idea in terms of individuals' expression 
of collective intentions in groups, and explains this as a way of seeing 
individuals as distinct and independent. The focus on a self-individuating 
capacity-individuals having a capacity to not only move across social 
groups while maintaining a relative independence, but also a capacity 
within groups to freely tie themselves to the consequences of the collective 
intentions they express-was meant to be a step in the direction of the 
capability framework. My view was that individuals have the native capaci-
ties stated above, but may fail to succeed in exercising them, and thus fail to 
develop associated capabilities. If we think of personal identity as requiring 
that individuals be both distinct and re-identifiable beings, then individuals 
who regularly exercise this self-individuating capacity in interaction with 
others are re-identifiable in terms of this capacity. But individuals who fail 
to regularly exercise this native capacity lack personal identities and lose 
their status as individuals to their social identifications with others. 
Thus, this interpretation of Sen's thinking makes personal identity a 
particular capability among many that individuals may develop. I argue in 
section 5 that it is a centrally important capability. What might be thought to 
be missing from this discussion, however, is Sen's own emphasis on commit-
ment. I consequendy tum in the following section to argue that many of the 
same themes as appear in the analysis above re-emerge when we use Sen's 
thinking about commitment to develop an account of personal identity. 
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4. Self-scrutiny, rules, and integrity-conferring 
commitments 
Sen links commitment and the status of individuals as independent, self-
scrutinizing agents, but he also links commitment to social identification. 
How are these two ways in which he speaks of commitment compatible 
with one another? Here I first review the development in Sen's thinking 
about the concept of commitment from his early "Rational Fools" paper to 
his later thinking that associates commitment and the self-scrutinizing aspect 
of the sel£ Then I review Bernard Williams' thinking about commitment 
that dissociates it from desire-e!1dorsement, and interprets it rather as an 
identity-conferring behavior of the individual. Finally I draw these two 
sets of views together to suggest an account of how Sen might be said to 
understand personal identity and social identity in a manner that recalls the 
collective intentionality-inspired account of these concepts in the previous 
section. 
4.1. Sen on commitment 
As seen above, if we go back to Sen's "Rational Fools" discussion of 
the concept of commitment, we find him primarily emphasizing the 
idea that commitment "drives a wedge between personal choice and 
personal welfare" (Sen 1977: 329). Comparing sympathy and commitment, 
sympathy involves a concern for others that affects one's welfare directly, 
while in the case of commitment one's welfare is only incidentally related 
to one's choice and certainly not the reason for it. One way of expressing 
this is to say that action based on sympathy is in a sense " egoistic" whereas 
action based on commitment is by this standard "non-egoistic" (ibid.: 326). 
Alternatively commitment involves "counterpreferential choice" (ibid.: 
328), though it is still possible that acting on the basis of a commitment 
may coincide by chance with the maximization of personal welfare. These 
characterizations of commitment in terms of what it is not are supplemented 
by suggestions regarding what might motivate commitment: a sense of duty, 
one's morals, or a sense of obligation going beyond the consequences. At 
the same time, Sen does not require that commitment draw on moral 
motives, and emphasizes that morality or culture both offer individuals a 
basis for the commitments they make. Indeed, in response to the suggestion 
that we may have two kinds of preferences, subjective and ethical, with the 
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latter reflecting a kind of impartiality (Harsanyi 1955), Sen notes that an 
individual may be quite partial in making commitments to " some particular 
group, say to the neighborhood or to the social class to which he belongs" 
(ibid.: 337). 
But Sen's explicit introduction of the reasoning and self-scrutinizing 
aspect of the self after "Rational Fools" brings out a new and somewhat 
different dimension to his thinking about commitment and identity. Thus 
in one important later discussion, where he links the reasoning and 
self-scrutinizing self and social identification, he also emphasizes the non-
instrumental, "intrinsic importance . .. attached to following certain rules of 
behavior" that are operative in the groups with which one identifles (Sen 
2002: 217n): 
One of the ways in which the sense of identity can operate is through making 
members of a community accept certain rules of conduct as part of obligatory 
behavior toward others in a community. It is not a matter of asking each time, 
What do I get out of it? How are my own goals furthered in this way?, but of 
taking for granted the case for certain patterns of behavior toward others. (Sen 
2002: 216-17) 
We might infer from this that only reasoning and self-scrutinizing individ-
uals, who are themselves detached in this aspect of their selves from the 
instrumentality of self-goal choice, are able to recognize in a correlative 
manner that certain social rules of behavior also have non-instrumental, 
intrinsic value. Social identification with others, Sen is arguing, presupposes 
rather than eliminates individual detachment and independence from those 
with whom one identifies, and it does so just because commitment to 
others takes the form of a reasoned appreciation of the intrinsic value of 
the rules operating in those groups. Commitment, consequently, is not an 
unreflective type of attachment to others, but rather a rational recogni-
tion of rules associated with social membership that can only be achieved 
by individuals who have distanced themselves from their own interest as 
self-scrutinizing individuals. 
4.2. Williams on commitment and integrity 
The origins of recent interest in the concept of commitment are Williams' 
use of it in his critique of the theory of action implied by act utilitarianism. 
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Utilitarianism, he tells us, offers "a general project of bringing about maxi-
mally desirable outcomes," but leaves out certain other projects, interests, 
and causes-both small-scale and large-scale-to which individuals com-
monly find they have made commitments (Williams 1973 : 110-11). This 
omission cannot be remedied by attempting to interpret commitment in 
utilitarian terms. While pursuing one's commitments may happen to make 
one happy, "it does not follow, nor could it possibly be true, that those 
projects [to which one is committed] are themselves projects of pursuing 
happiness" (ibid.: 113). On one level, one's commitments "flow from some 
more general disposition toward human conduct and character, such as a 
hatred of injustice, or of cruelty, or ofk.illing" (ibid.: II I). But on another 
level, an individual's commitments stem more fundamentally from "what 
his life is about" (ibid.: I 16). Thus Williams comments, 
It is absurd to demand of such a man [one with commitments], when the sums 
come in from the utility network which the projects of others have in part 
detennined, that he should just step aside from his own project and decision and 
acknowledge the decision that the utilitarian calculation requires ... [T]his is to 
neglect the extent to which his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the 
actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is 
most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity. 
(ibid.: 116-17) 
One's commitments, then, are not only not instrumental to happiness 
or other good consequences, but because they "flow from the projects 
and attitudes with which [the individual] is most closely identified," they 
additionally enable individuals to provide themselves a sense of their own 
integrity as individuals. 
As Williams (1981) later further developed this view, the 'identity view 
of integrity', individuals have and act with integrity when they act on their 
commitments-those motives, interests, and attitudes that reflect who 
they are in the most fundamental way. Or, individuals act with integrity 
when they make what Williams terms "identity-conferring commitments." 
The emphasis in this idea suggests that commitment is a relation between 
individuals and others that arises out of positions individuals reflexively take 
toward themselves.6 Because-or when-individuals make commitments 
to others, they are able to confer identity upon themselves. Put the other 
way around, if individuals fail to make commitments to others, they fail 
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to create a sense of personal identity for themselves. But what are we 
to say about individuals having different, often competing commitments? 
Williams' answer, it seems, must be that while individuals' competing 
commitments appear to fragment them, their very capacity for having 
and making commitments per se invests them with integrity, which itself 
makes them distinct and unitary beings. Indeed, in his original critique of 
utilitarianism, Williams saw the absence of any account of the individual 
as an agent as an important flaw. Utilitarian calculations always exhibit 
an abstract, impersonal- even "churchy"-quality, tending to slide off 
toward some kind of "impersonally benevolent happiness-management" 
(Williams 1973: 110, I 12). Commitments, however, are generally made by 
individuals? That is, by nature they are inherendy personalizing. Let us, 
then, draw on this understanding of commitment to further develop Sen's 
own understanding. 
4.3. Sen on commitment and identity 
While their immediate concerns are different, with Sen interested in the 
behavioral foundations of economics and Williams interested in moral 
theory, they are both concerned to develop an adequate theory of action, 
and both agree that the concept of commitment cannot be accommodat-
ed within the framework of utilitarian consequentialist reasoning. What 
additionally appears to be shared between them is the view that personal 
identity is dependent upon individuals being able to make commitments to 
others, or, that social identification is a means to achieving personal iden-
tity. Whereas standard preference-based conceptions of the individual may 
be seen as seeking to explain the personal identity of individual economic 
agents atornistically, or apart from their interactions with others (Davis 
2003b), the Sen-Williams commitment-based conception of the individ-
ual may be seen as seeking to explain the personal identity of individual 
economic agents relationally, or through their interactions with others. 
For both Sen and Williams this relational view of personal identity 
relies on commitment having a reflexive dimension. Sen holds that only 
reasoning and self-scrutinizing individuals, detached in this particular aspect 
of their selves from the instrumentality of self-goal choice, are able to make 
commitments to others, because only as individuals thus self-engaged are 
they able to recognize the correlative, intrinsic, non-instrumental value of 
social rules. Similarly, for Williams, individuals act upon themselves when 
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they confer integrity upon themselves by making commitments to others 
that put aside impersonal, consequentialist utilitarian reasoning. How, then, 
does this reflexive self-scrutiny or identity self-conferral invest individuals 
with personal identity? Taking distinctness as the fIrst and primary element 
in any account of personal identity, the act of taking oneself as a separate 
object of consideration is equivalent to treating oneself as distinct and 
independent. When individuals adopt a position of reflexive self-regard, 
they self-individuate themselves. For Sen and Williams, then, making 
commitments to others individuates the commitment-maker. 
This account of the individuation side of personal identity focused on 
commitment is similar to the collective intentionality-based account of 
individuation in the previous section. There I argued individuals have 
a native capacity to freely self-constrain themselves when they express 
we-intentions in social groups. That only individuals can freely self-
constrain themselves effectively distinguishes them as distinct individuals. 
Here, commitment functions in essentially the same way. We might infer, 
then, that commitment is an act in which individuals freely self-constrain 
themselves to others. Thus it is interesting that Sen employs "we" language 
(Sen 2002: 215) when he speaks of commitment and social identiftcation, 
since this suggests that we are entitled to transfer the individuating character 
of we-intention behavior to commitment behavior. Note also that I 
suggested that individuals' being able to freely self-constrain themselves 
to what their we-intentions require of them in social groups is a native 
capacity. In terms of the Sen- Williams understanding of commitment, we 
might accordingly say that being able to make commitments is also a native 
individual capacity. 
This raises the question of whether the second element in any account 
of personal identity, namely, the re-identiftcation requirement, plays a role 
in the commitment framework. In the collective intentionality account, 
re-identiftcation is contingent upon individuals being able to regularly 
exercise their capacity to freely constrain themselves in social groups over 
time and across different types of social settings in which they participate. 
That is, re-identification is a matter of individuals developing a special 
capability. The commitment account of Sen's thinking, I believe, has a 
slightly different emphasis, since while we may imagine that individuals lose 
or fail to develop this special capability due to a variety of factors having 
to do with the nature of their lives and experience and with the ways 
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in which societies are organized, when we rather speak of commitment 
it seems odd to say people are not always able to make commitments to 
others. But if they are always able to form commitments to others, then 
on the argument here they would always be re-identifiable as distinct, 
commitment-making individuals, and would thus always have personal 
identities. That is, having personal identity would not be a capability, but 
rather a native capacity. In the section that follows, I rather opt for the 
capability view of re-identification and personal identity as the preferred 
interpretation of Sen's thinking about personal identity, and accordingly 
assume that whether individuals are able to consistently form commitments 
to others over their lifetimes depends on the same variety of factors having 
to do with the nature of their lives and the ways in which societies are 
organized. My grounds for this is that this makes whether individuals 
have personal identities a contingent matter endogenous to the economic 
process, and thus an object of social-economic policy. In conclusion, 
therefore, I defme personal identity for Sen as a special capability whereby 
individuals exercise a reflexive capacity to make commitments in social 
settings in a sustained way. 
5. Personal identity and the capability framework 
A familiar and oft-repeated criticism of Sen's capability framework is that it 
lacks a short-list of essential capabilities that, a la Aristotle, would provide 
a single, universal set of policy recommendations regarding capability 
development (e.g., Nussbaum 2003). Sen has consistently resisted the idea 
that there ought to be an essential short-list of human capabilities on the 
grounds of flexibility in application and social diversity, but this reply has 
not been persuasive to some, perhaps in part due to the appeal of having 
a single, essential view of the individual and a set of universal policy 
prescriptions. In this section, then, I briefly attempt to reconcile these two 
positions by arguing for the central importance of one capability: having a 
personal identity. 8 
One way of looking at capabilities takes them to be freedoms (Sen 
I 999a). We have many freedoms according to the many capabilities we 
develop. More generally, freedom is a central value and behavioral feature 
of individuals according to Sen. Can individuals, then, be thought to be 
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free beings if they are unable to generally sustain personal identities over 
their lifetimes? The type of freedom at issue here is a positive freedom 
to carry out one's plans and goals as an agent. In connection with the 
concept of freedom, Sen understands being an "agent" not as in standard 
principal- agent analysis, but rather in its "older-and 'grander'-sense 
as someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements 
can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives" (Sen 1999a: 19). 
But if individuals are unable to regularly exercise a capacity to freely bind 
themselves by the obligations and requirements of groups with which they 
associate, or if they are unable to genuinely form commitments to others, it 
is not clear how they can be regarded as agents able to act and bring about 
change with achievements judged in terms of own values and objectives. 
Thus it seems fair to say that the entire capabilities-as-freedoms framework 
depends on the one central freedom or capability of being able to sustain 
a personal identity. That is, underlying the development and exercise of 
all our more particular capabilities is a general capability of being able to 
freely sustain oneself in an environment that everywhere involves social 
interaction. 
The "Aristotelian" capability approach requires either a definite list 
of essential capabilities or some hierarchical organization of capabilities 
by importance. If we prescribe social policies aimed at ensuring that 
individuals have opportunities to develop a personal identity capability, 
then we indeed make one capability both essential and prior to all other 
capabilities. But we do not go the full Aristotelian route by filling out 
a complete list of essential capabilities or by organizing them in some 
hierarchical order. There seem to be at least two reasons for applying 
this reading to Sen's framework. First, it still preserves his intuition that 
the capability framework works best when it flexibly accommodates social 
diversity. Second, it reinforces the role of the concept of freedom in that 
framework by further rooting it in a re-characterization of Sen's strong 
sense of agents as beings who also seek to maintain personal identities. 
As a reconciliation of Sen's and the more classic Aristotelian approach, 
this strategy offers perhaps more determinacy in policy determination than 
Sen's own open-ended strategy, is still Aristotelian in making one feature 
of human life essential, but departs from Aristotle in providing a different 
view of the good life, and in giving pride of place to the more modem 
value of freedom. 
332 JOHN B. DAVIS 
6. Concluding remarks 
I close by way of brief comment on four general themes that motivate 
this paper rather than with a summary of the discussion of the paper 
itself. First, the paper follows a development in Sen's own thinking which 
moves from an examination of standard economics' characterization of self-
interest to a fourth aspect of the self associated with reasoned self-scrutiny, 
and which gives increased importance and meaning to the concept of 
commitment. My view is that the issue of personal identity only emerges 
once this fourth aspect of the self is clearly introduced, and introduced 
in connection with the tensions it creates between personal and social 
identity. Accordingly the paper takes the development of Sen's thinking 
along this pathway to have itself created an agenda for examination of 
personal identity where it formerly was absent. Second, as this previous 
remark implies, the approach to personal identity here and in thinking 
about individual behavior in economics in general need not recall the 
approaches to personal identity taken in philosophy where in recent years 
different sorts of issues have been investigated. Thus the treatment of 
personal identity in economics may not, and it seems need not, conform to 
other concerns about the concept in philosophy and elsewhere. There are 
obviously many ways of talking about identity, personal and social, and the 
discussion in this paper is intended to be specific to a particular history of 
thinking about individuals in economics. Third, what seems to be key to 
this particular history of thinking about individuals in economics is a failure 
in most of the literature on the individual to ask whether individuality is 
endogenous to the social-economic process. That is, this literature fails to 
establish what makes individuals distinct, and this explains why much of 
my discussion here and elsewhere makes the individuation requirement 
a focus. Fourth, what especially distinguishes the treatment of personal 
identity here is the emphasis on reflexivity. Partly this reflects the emphasis 
that this concept possesses in thinking about individuals in economics, both 
in standard economics and in Sen's thinking. But it also reflects what I 
perceive likely to be the strongest route to successfully explaining individual 
distinctness and independence given the various determining influences on 
individual behavior. The discussion in this paper, then, aims to make this 
concept central by bringing out its role in the development from standard 
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economics' characterizations of the self-interest aspects of the self to Sen's 
commitment sense of the sel£ 
Notes 
* The author is grateful to Solange Marin, Ingrid Robeyns, Fabienne 
Peter, Bernhard Schmid, and the referees for this volume for comments 
on earlier versions of the paper. An earlier version of this paper appeared 
as Davis (2004). 
I. Note that Sen recognizes that not all commitments are to individuals but 
may also be to such things as causes and principles. 
2. This is reinforced in something of an aside where Sen suggests, following 
Marx, that it might even be said that private interest itself is socially 
determined (Sen 2002: 2Isn) . But Sen's treatment of the different senses 
of "privateness" as all aspects of the self goes against this. 
3. Anderson (2001) draws this connection, and links it to the concept of 
identity in Sen. 
4. For example, one might argue that an important dimension of anti-
discrimination law in the United States with respect to women is 
that it prevents employers from inquiring about family status, and thus 
restricting or imposing high costs on their mobility between domestic 
and employment roles . 
5. Here I put aside complications associated with what happens when 
normal success conditions are not fulfilled, such as when others disagree 
but do not show it, when there is deceptive use of "we" speech, or 
when one individual imposes a "we" statement on others. These kinds 
of cases may be argued to be parasitic on the normal use of "we." 
6. It can be argued that, for Williams, commitments need not be made 
to others, but that individuals may simply have certain commitments. I 
focus here on the case where commitments are at least implicitly made 
to others. 
7. However, Margaret Gilbert, in her contribution to this volume (ch. II), 
argues for a concept of joint commitment. 
8. For procedural approach to reconciliation that emphasizes social delib-
eration, see Robeyns (2003). 
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